Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Full Details

Title: Too many Voters to Fail: Influencing and Political Bargaining for Bailouts

Author(s): Linda Marlene Schilling

Publication Date: December 2019

Keyword(s): bail-outs, Capital Structure, Corporate Finance, Economic voting, influencing and political economy

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics, Monetary Economics and Fluctuations and Public Economics

Abstract: The paper provides a novel theory of how banks not only exploit but also cause being perceived as 'too big to fail'. Bank creditors are also voters. Economic voting prompts politicians to grant bailouts given a bank failure. The bank's capital structure acts as a tool to impact the electoral vote and thus the bail-out by changing the relative group size of voters who favor as opposed to voters who object the bailout. The creditors' anticipation of high bailouts, in return, allows the bank to reduce funding costs today, by this maximizing revenues.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14243

Bibliographic Reference

Schilling, L. 2019. 'Too many Voters to Fail: Influencing and Political Bargaining for Bailouts'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14243