Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP14408 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: (Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting

Author(s): Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell and Mallesh Pai

Publication Date: February 2020

Keyword(s): bad reputation, experts and relational contracting

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Motivated by markets for "expertise," we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with the risky arm. However, only the high type arm can generate value for the principal. Our main insight is that reputational incentives can be exceedingly strong unless both players coordinate on maximally inefficient strategies on path. We discuss implications for online content markets, term limits for politicians and experts in organizations.

For full details and related downloads, please visit:

Bibliographic Reference

Deb, R, Mitchell, M and Pai, M. 2020. '(Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.