Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP14412 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments

Author(s): Alex Krumer, Reut Megidish and Aner Sela

Publication Date: February 2020


Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.

For full details and related downloads, please visit:

Bibliographic Reference

Krumer, A, Megidish, R and Sela, A. 2020. 'Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments '. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.