Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP14480 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Investor-State vs. State-State Dispute Settlement

Author(s): Henrik Horn and Thomas Tangerås

Publication Date: March 2020

Keyword(s): expropriation, IDSD, international investment agreement and regulatory chill

Programme Area(s): International Trade and Regional Economics

Abstract: International investment agreements have been intensely criticized, and in particular the "ISDS" mechanisms that enable foreign investors to litigate against host countries. This paper examines the common claim that host countries benefiÂ?t from state-state dispute settlement (SSDS), since this yields less litigation. It assumes the standard rationale for ISDS, that SSDS causes political litigation costs. It shows how a host country might indeed beneÂ?fit from SSDS, but that there is no presumption that these conditions will prevail. Furthermore, negotiations regarding dispute settlement will plausibly yield ISDS, regardless of the distributional consequences for host countries, since SSDS is Pareto inefficient.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14480

Bibliographic Reference

Horn, H and Tangerås, T. 2020. 'Investor-State vs. State-State Dispute Settlement'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14480