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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Collusive Market Allocations

Author(s): Elisabetta Iossa, Simon Loertscher, Leslie Marx and Patrick Rey

Publication Date: April 2020

Keyword(s): Coordinated effects, sustainability and initiation of collusion and synchronized vs staggered purchasing

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Collusive schemes by suppliers often take the form of allocating customers or markets among cartel members. We analyze incentives for suppliers to initiate and sustain such a collusive schemes in a repeated procurement setting. We show that, contrary to some prevailing beliefs, staggered (versus synchronized) purchasing does not make collusion more difficult to sustain or initiate. Buyer defensive measures include synchronized rather than staggered purchasing, first-price rather than second-price auctions, more aggressive or secrete reserve prices, longer contract lengths, withholding information, and avoiding observable registration procedures. Inefficiency induced by defensive measures is an often unrecognized social cost of collusive conduct.

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Bibliographic Reference

Iossa, E, Loertscher, S, Marx, L and Rey, P. 2020. 'Collusive Market Allocations'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14563