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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation

Author(s): Winand Emons

Publication Date: October 1996

Keyword(s): Contingent Fees, Expert Services, Incentives and Litigation

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Plaintiffs have either strong or weak cases. Both cases should be taken to court, yet weak cases need more work by the attorney than strong cases. Only the attorney knows whether a case needs additional work or not; the plaintiff is forced to rely on the attorney?s recommendation. We show that under contingent fees there will generally be excessive litigation. In contrast, an hourly fee implements the efficient amount of litigation.

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Bibliographic Reference

Emons, W. 1996. 'Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1487