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Title: Stackelberg Independence

Author(s): Toomas Hinnosaar

Publication Date: July 2020

Keyword(s): Oligopolies, Sequential Games and Stackelberg leadership model

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders' actions are informative about market conditions and independent of leaders' beliefs about the arrivals of followers. However, this Stackelberg independence property relies on all standard assumptions being satisfied. It fails to hold whenever the demand function is non-linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are differentiated, firms are non-identical, or there are any externalities. I show that small deviations from the linear demand assumption may make the leaders' choices completely uninformative.

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Bibliographic Reference

Hinnosaar, T. 2020. 'Stackelberg Independence'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=14978