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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: The economics of deferral and clawback requirements

Author(s): Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp

Publication Date: July 2020

Keyword(s): bonus deferral, clawbacks, compensation regulation, moral hazard, principal-agent models with externalities and Short-termism

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting (incentive) compensation of material risk-takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on equilibrium risk-management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high, else, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. We characterize when regulators should not impose any deferral regulation at all, when it can achieve second-best welfare, when additional clawback requirements are of value, and highlight the interaction with capital regulation.

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Bibliographic Reference

Hoffmann, F, Inderst, R and Opp, M. 2020. 'The economics of deferral and clawback requirements'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15081