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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: When does board diversity benefit shareholders? Strategic deadlock as a commitment to monitor

Author(s): Alexander P. Ljungqvist and Konrad Raff

Publication Date: August 2020

Keyword(s): Boards of directors, deadlock, diversity and Monitoring

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: We ask when and how a diverse board can benefit shareholders. Board diversity may be value-increasing even if some directors have agendas that are not perfectly aligned with shareholders' interests. Diversity commits the board to a high information standard because directors with opposing agendas are deadlocked unless they have persuasive information in support of the optimal course of action. Since deadlock is costly, diversity strengthens directors' incentives to gather information ex ante, which raises expected firm value. Diversity is more likely desirable if the firm's information environment is poor and if directors' opposing agendas are accompanied by sufficiently strong incentives for value maximization. However, if directors cannot credibly communicate their information, a homogeneous board dominates a diverse board.

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Bibliographic Reference

Ljungqvist, A and Raff, K. 2020. 'When does board diversity benefit shareholders? Strategic deadlock as a commitment to monitor'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15165