Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP1517 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Mergers for Market Power in a Cournot Setting and Merger Guidelines

Author(s): Ramon Faulí-Oller

Publication Date: November 1996

Keyword(s): Mergers and Welfare

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: The US Merger Guidelines consider that the anticompetitive effect of a horizontal merger is increasing in the initial market concentration and decreasing in the elasticity of demand. These ideas are studied in a setting where identical firms compete a la Cournot and marginal cost is constant. The former relationship holds if demand is convex, but it may fail to be true if demand is concave. The latter condition holds only if the elasticity of demand is increasing in the degree of concavity. This is satisfied by linear demands, constant elasticity demands, and demands that are log-linear in price.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1517

Bibliographic Reference

Faulí-Oller, R. 1996. 'Mergers for Market Power in a Cournot Setting and Merger Guidelines'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1517