Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources

Author(s): Marek Pycia and M. Utku ‹nver

Publication Date: October 2020


Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: In environments where heterogeneous indivisible resources are being allocated without monetary transfers and each agent has a unit demand, we show that an allocation mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient, i.e., it always selects the best outcome with respect to some Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Re-interpreting Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in terms of auditability of the mechanism, we further show that these are precisely the mechanisms that are strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and auditable.

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Bibliographic Reference

Pycia, M and ‹nver, M. 2020. 'Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.