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Title: Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post-war Japan

Author(s): Morten Bennedsen, Vikas Mehrotra, Jungwook Shim and Yupana Wiwattanakantang

Publication Date: October 2020

Keyword(s): Family control, ownership and Succession

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family's ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bennedsen, M, Mehrotra, V, Shim, J and Wiwattanakantang, Y. 2020. 'Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post-war Japan'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15398