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Title: Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote

Author(s): Felix Bierbrauer and Mattias Polborn

Publication Date: October 2020

Keyword(s): Gerrymandering, legislative elections and redistricting

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: Gerrymandering undermines representative democracy by creating many uncompetitive legislative districts, and generating the very real possibility that a party that wins a clear majority of the popular vote does not win a majority of districts. We present a new approach to the determination of electoral districts, taking a design perspective. Specifically, we develop a redistricting game between two parties who both seek an advantage in upcoming elections, and show that we can achieve two desirable properties: First, the overall election outcome corresponds to the popular vote. Second, most districts are competitive.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bierbrauer, F and Polborn, M. 2020. 'Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15401