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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining

Author(s): T. Renee Bowen, Ilwoo Hwang and Stefan Krasa

Publication Date: October 2020

Keyword(s): Bargaining, Gridlock, learning and Power

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We study a dynamic bargaining model between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setter's proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her "personal power". The players learn about the setter's power as gridlock persists. Gridlock occurs when the setter's perceived power is either too high or too low, and the players reach compromise in an intermediate interval of beliefs. The presence of "difficult" issues can induce more compromise as the players have incentives to avoid learning.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bowen, T, Hwang, I and Krasa, S. 2020. 'Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15406