Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda

Author(s): Konrad B. Burchardi, Jonathan de Quidt, Selim Gulesci, Benedetta Lerva and Stefano Tripodi

Publication Date: February 2021

Keyword(s): Becker-DeGroot-Marschak, field experiment and Willingness to pay

Programme Area(s): Development Economics

Abstract: Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in the mechanism, which are well-known problems with the BDM. We highlight three such features and test them in the field in rural Uganda, a relevant population for many recent applications. Comprehension is very high, and 86 percent of participants bid optimally for an induced-value voucher, with little variation across treatments. This gives confidence for similar applications, and suggests the comprehension-expediency trade-off is mild.

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Bibliographic Reference

Burchardi, K, de Quidt, J, Gulesci, S, Lerva, B and Tripodi, S. 2021. 'Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.