Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP1600 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details | Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament

Author(s): Annick Laruelle and Mika Widgr�n

Publication Date: March 1997

Keyword(s): EU, Game Theory, Inter-governmental Conference and Voting Power

Programme Area(s): International Trade and Regional Economics

Abstract: Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. We propose a probabilistic reduced extensive form voting game. By subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for example, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1600

Bibliographic Reference

Laruelle, A and Widgr�n, M. 1997. 'The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1600