Discussion Paper Details

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Title: The Perils of Friendly Oversight

Author(s): Dino Gerardi, Edoardo Grillo and Ignacio Monzón

Publication Date: May 2021

Keyword(s): information transmission, moral hazard, oversight and Persuasion

Programme Area(s): Organizational Economics

Abstract: In democratic societies, politicians craft reform proposals which are then subject to the scrutiny of external authorities. Politicians want their proposals approved and can work to improve their quality. Authorities have their own agendas: they may be in favor or against the reforms under their scrutiny. We study how the authority's agenda affects the likelihood that a reform is approved and its quality. We show that an authority in favor of a reform can be detrimental towards its approval. This happens when it is easy to incentivize the politician's work and the status quo alternative is not too attractive.

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Bibliographic Reference

Gerardi, D, Grillo, E and Monzón, I. 2021. 'The Perils of Friendly Oversight'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.