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Title: The Value of a Coordination Game

Author(s): Wouter Kager, Willemien Kets and Alvaro Sandroni

Publication Date: June 2021

Keyword(s):

Programme Area(s): Organizational Economics

Abstract: The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare.

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Bibliographic Reference

Kager, W, Kets, W and Sandroni, A. 2021. 'The Value of a Coordination Game'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16229