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Title: To Each According To...? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints

Author(s): Raquel Fernández and Jordi Galí

Publication Date: May 1997

Keyword(s): Borrowing Constraints, Markets, Matching and Tournaments

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: We compare the performance of markets and tournaments as allocative mechanisms in an economy with borrowing constraints. The model consists of a continuum of individuals who differ in their initial wealth and ability level (e.g. students) and that are to be assigned to a continuum of investment opportunities or inputs of different productivity (e.g. schools of different qualities). With perfect capital markets both mechanisms achieve the efficient allocation, though markets generate higher aggregate consumption because of the waste associated with the production of signals under tournaments. When borrowing constraints are present, however, tournaments dominate markets in terms of aggregate output and, for sufficiently powerful signalling technologies, also in terms of aggregate consumption.

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Bibliographic Reference

Fernández, R and Galí, J. 1997. 'To Each According To...? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1627