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Title: Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies

Author(s): Winand Emons

Publication Date: May 1997

Keyword(s): Imperfect Tests, Inefficient Entry, Insurance, Natural Monopoly and Sustainability

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: This paper considers a housing insurance market in which buildings have different damage probabilities. Insurers use imperfect tests to find out about buildings? damage types. The insurance market is a natural monopoly. If more than one insurer is active, high risk house owners continue to apply to insurers until they are eventually assigned to a low-risk class. First we show that the natural insurance monopoly need not be sustainable. Then we show that in the equilibrium industry structure the incumbent may accommodate entry even when the natural monopoly is sustainable. The theoretical findings are thus able to explain recent observations from Germany and Switzerland where housing insurance damage rates and prices went up drastically after the transition from state monopolies to competitive environments.

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Bibliographic Reference

Emons, W. 1997. 'Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1644