Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets

Author(s): Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath

Publication Date: August 2021

Keyword(s): All-pay auction, Blotto budgets, collective action, incomplete information, intra-group conflict and threshold public good

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We study collective action under adverse incentives: each member of the group has a given budget ('use-it-or-lose-it') that is his private information and that can be used for contributions to make the group win a prize and for internal fights about this very prize. Even in the face of such rivalry in resource use, the group often succeeds to overcome the collective action problem in non-cooperative equilibrium. One type of equilibrium has group members who both contribute, the other type has volunteers who make full stand-alone contributions. Both types of equilibrium exist for larger and partially overlapping parameter ranges.

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Bibliographic Reference

Konrad, K and Morath, F. 2021. 'Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.