Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Score Disclosure

Author(s): Levent Celik and Mikhail Drugov

Publication Date: November 2021

Keyword(s): Monopoly, multidimensional types, Quality uncertainty and verifiable information disclosure

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We study verifiable disclosure by a monopolist when the product has multiple quality attributes. We identify an equilibrium in which the firm discloses a score---the average of the qualities---without revealing any further information. While full unraveling is still an equilibrium, it is dominated by the score equilibrium in terms of ex ante as well as ex post profits. Moreover, it is ``defeated'' by the score equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Reference

Celik, L and Drugov, M. 2021. 'Score Disclosure'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.