Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP16715 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: On the Interaction between Patent Screening and its Enforcement

Author(s): Gerard Llobet, Álvaro Parra and Javier Suarez

Publication Date: November 2021

Keyword(s): Imitation, industry dynamics, Innovation, Intellectual Property, Patent Enforcement and Patent Screening

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: This paper explores the interplay between patent screening and patent enforcement. Costly enforcement involves type I and type II errors. When the patent office takes the rates at which such errors occur as given, granting some invalid patents is socially optimal even in the absence of screening costs because it encourages innovation. When the influence on courts' enforcement effort is considered, these same forces imply that screening and enforcement are complementary. This means that, contrary to common wisdom, better screening induces better enforcement but also that an increase in enforcement costs could be optimally accommodated with less rather than more ex-ante screening.

For full details and related downloads, please visit:

Bibliographic Reference

Llobet, G, Parra, Á and Suarez, J. 2021. 'On the Interaction between Patent Screening and its Enforcement'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.