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Title: Non-bossiness and First-Price Auctions

Author(s): Marek Pycia and Madhav Raghavan

Publication Date: January 2022

Keyword(s):

Programme Area(s): Organizational Economics

Abstract: We show that the first-price auction with no reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational, and efficient in equilibrium. The first-price auction with optimal reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational, and revenue maximizing.

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Bibliographic Reference

Pycia, M and Raghavan, M. 2022. 'Non-bossiness and First-Price Auctions'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16874