Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP16882 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements

Author(s): Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp

Publication Date: January 2022

Keyword(s): bonus deferral, clawbacks, Compensation design, financial regulation, moral hazard and Short-termism

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics and Industrial Organization

Abstract: We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting incentive compensation of material risk-takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on equilibrium risk-management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high, else, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. We characterize when regulators should not impose any deferral regulation at all, when it can achieve second-best welfare, when additional clawback requirements are of value, and highlight the interaction with capital regulation.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16882

Bibliographic Reference

Hoffmann, F, Inderst, R and Opp, M. 2022. 'The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16882