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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature

Author(s): Paul Klemperer

Publication Date: June 1999

Keyword(s): Auction Theory, Auctions, Bidding, Common-Value Auctions, Mechanism Design and Private-Value-Auctions

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and bibliographies.

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Bibliographic Reference

Klemperer, P. 1999. 'Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2163