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Title: The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy

Author(s): Jon Faust and Lars E.O. Svensson

Publication Date: August 1999

Keyword(s): Commitment and Discretion

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. Under commitment, we find that the deliberate choice of sloppy control is far less likely under a standard central-bank loss function than reported for a less standard loss function by Cukierman and Meltzer. Under discretion, maximum degree of control is the only equilibrium. With regard to the degree of transparency, under commitment, a sufficiently patient bank with sufficiently low average inflation bias will always choose minimum transparency. Under discretion, both minimum and maximum transparency are equilibria. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency. A maximum feasible degree of control with a minimum degree of transparency is then a likely outcome. The Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System are, arguably, examples of this outcome.

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Bibliographic Reference

Faust, J and Svensson, L. 1999. 'The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2195