Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP2328 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

Author(s): Anne Sibert

Publication Date: December 1999

Keyword(s): Central Banks, Collective Decision Making and Reputation

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy-making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2328

Bibliographic Reference

Sibert, A. 1999. 'Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2328