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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence

Author(s): Timothy J. Besley and Stephen Coate

Publication Date: February 2000

Keyword(s): Elections, Electricity and Regulation

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues for which the appointing politicians are responsible. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party élites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the saliency of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from US states, we find evidence in favour of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.

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Bibliographic Reference

Besley, T and Coate, S. 2000. 'Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2381