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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Role of Reputation

Author(s): Jennifer Corbett and Janet Mitchell

Publication Date: May 2000

Keyword(s): banking crises, Banking Regulation and Financial Reforms

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on the behaviour of troubled banks in light of rescue offers. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises is that in many cases policy authorities make offers of bank rescue, and banks are reluctant to accept these offers. We study situations in which regulators have decided to offer bank rescue plans, and we show that a combination of factors, including bankers' reputational concerns, can explain banks' potential reluctance to accept offers of recapitalization.

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Bibliographic Reference

Corbett, J and Mitchell, J. 2000. 'Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Role of Reputation'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2453