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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model

Author(s): George-Marios Angeletos and Tryphon Kollintzas

Publication Date: May 2000

Keyword(s): Corruption, Growth, Property Rights and Rent Seeking

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking and corruption in the growth context. We develop an endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs, as intermediate-good producers, may engage in rent-seeking activities. The latter are defined by the following properties: (i) their internal effect is positive; (ii) their external effect is negative; and (iii) they use real resources. Our formulation may be viewed as a parable for theft and fraud; organized crime; industrial espionage; lobbying and policy influence; misgovernance, institutional inefficiency, tax evasion, etc. The economy is shown to fall into a trap of high rent seeking/corruption and low growth. Agents' perceptions about the external effects of rent seeking, and the complementarity or substitutability of intermediate inputs, are crucial. Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher returns to capital and more competition can be detrimental for welfare and growth, as they induce more rent seeking/corruption. Finally, our paradigm yields insights into the relationship of R&D, politicoeconomic equilibrium, income distribution, and growth, as well as the design of tax/growth policies in the presence of rent seeking/corruption.

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Bibliographic Reference

Angeletos, G and Kollintzas, T. 2000. 'Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2464