Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP2552 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Try Me! On Job Assignments as a Screening Device

Author(s): Juan D Carrillo

Publication Date: September 2000

Keyword(s): Career Concerns, Job Allocation, Personnel Economics, Relative Evaluation and Screening

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization and Public Economics

Abstract: We study the optimal allocation of screening tasks between two agents (incumbent vs. outsider or senior vs. junior) competing for one job. First, we characterize the inefficiencies from the principal's viewpoint of delegating the selection of the screening procedure to the incumbent. In general, the information disclosed by the screening tasks and the turnover rates will be inefficiently small due to the incumbent's willingness to undertake too many of these tasks. Second, we show that it may be optimal for organizations to favour the selection of outsider/junior agents relative to incumbent/senior ones because the former have greater implicit (career concern type) incentives than the latter to exert effort and perform efficiently.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2552

Bibliographic Reference

Carrillo, J. 2000. 'Try Me! On Job Assignments as a Screening Device'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2552