Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Competing for Ownership

Author(s): Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

Publication Date: October 2000

Keyword(s): Contract Theory, Mergers, Ownership and Shocks to Distribution

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We provide a simple framework for analysing how organizations are designed in a competitive economy. We focus on the allocation of rights of control and show that in the presence of liquidity constraints, transferring authority can serve as an effective means of transferring surplus, although this may entail some efficiency loss. The efficiency and organizational structure of a typical firm will depend on the liquidity of the ?marginal? agent in the market and not just on the liquidity and technology of the members of the firm. Liquidity changes in a small fraction of the population can lead to restructuring of ownership throughout the economy.

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Bibliographic Reference

Legros, P and Newman, A. 2000. 'Competing for Ownership'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2573