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Title: European Antidumping Policy and Firms' Strategic Choice of Quality

Author(s): Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy

Publication Date: November 2000

Keyword(s): Bertrand Competition, European Antidumping Policy, Injury, Quality and Welfare

Programme Area(s): International Trade and Regional Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a European industry characterized by vertical product differentiation. Using a two-stage model with quality choice made before price competition takes place, we show that EU anti-dumping policy that takes the form of price-undertakings offers a powerful protection to domestic firms, but only at the price competition stage. Once the impact of the A-D policy on quality choices is taken into account, European Welfare as well as profits accruing to the domestic firm decrease whenever the free trade equilibrium is affected. Hence we show that European Antidumping policies may induce ?perverse? leapfrogging.

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Bibliographic Reference

Vandenbussche, H and Wauthy, X. 2000. 'European Antidumping Policy and Firms' Strategic Choice of Quality'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2624