Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans

Author(s): Andres Almazan and Javier Suarez

Publication Date: December 2000

Keyword(s): Banks, Managerial Compensation, Monitoring and Optimal Contracts

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: This Paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analysed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private benefits, which can be restricted by the monitor, and is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within this setting, we find that managers will submit to monitoring when they receive favourable private information. This result is consistent with event study evidence that suggests that the market has a favourable view of financing choices that increase monitoring.

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Bibliographic Reference

Almazan, A and Suarez, J. 2000. 'Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.