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Title: Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian Growth

Author(s): David Martimort and Thierry Verdier

Publication Date: February 2001

Keyword(s): Bureaucratization, Dynamic Collusion, Internal Organization Of The Firm and Schumpeterian Growth

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization and International Macroeconomics

Abstract: This Paper analyses the link between the internal organization of firms, their individual life cycle and the whole process of macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internal collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, becoming more bureaucratized and less efficient over time. This bureaucratization affects both the intertemporal distribution of profits in a given sector and the distribution of output across sectors. In a general equilibrium model, bureaucratization has two effects: a profitability effect on the return of innovation and a reallocation effect on the skilled labour market. First, we analyse the existence and properties of stationary equilibrium growth. Second, we endogenize the transaction costs of side-contracting and show how the growth rate depends on various organizational parameters of firms.

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Bibliographic Reference

Martimort, D and Verdier, T. 2001. 'Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian Growth'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2700