Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP2778 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation

Author(s): Giancarlo Spagnolo

Publication Date: May 2001

Keyword(s): Cooperation, Cross-Border Spillovers, Delegation, International Agreements, International Institutions, Linkages and Policy Coordination

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics, International Trade and Regional Economics and Public Economics

Abstract: This Paper, a thorough revision of Spagnolo (1996), addresses the following questions: What is the optimal design for a set of self-enforcing international policy agreements? How many and which issues should each agreement regulate? Are GATT?s constraints on issue linkage (cross-retaliation) welfare-enhancing? To facilitate international cooperation should governments keep policy issues under centralized control, or should they delegate them to independent agencies (e.g. central banks)? In the second case, which issues should be delegated? Finally, institutions allowing governments to credibly delegate policy choices (e.g. to ?conservative? central bankers) are good or bad for international policy cooperation?

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2778

Bibliographic Reference

Spagnolo, G. 2001. 'Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2778