Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP2799 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition

Author(s): Ramon Faulí-Oller, Efe A Ok and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín

Publication Date: May 2001

Keyword(s): Polarization and Political Competition

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates are feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2799

Bibliographic Reference

Faulí-Oller, R, Ok, E and Ortuño-Ortín, I. 2001. 'Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2799