Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP2835 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Author(s): Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite

Publication Date: June 2001

Keyword(s): Incentives, Optimal Courts, Risk and Unforeseen Contingencies

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides whether to void or uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court, the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex-post.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2835

Bibliographic Reference

Anderlini, L, Felli, L and Postlewaite, A. 2001. 'Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2835