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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation

Author(s): Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher

Publication Date: August 2001

Keyword(s): common pool resources, experiments, fairness, fairness models, game theory and reciprocity

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.

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Bibliographic Reference

Falk, A, Fehr, E and Fischbacher, U. 2001. 'Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2925