Citation
Discussion Paper Details
Please find the details for DP2953 in an easy to copy and paste format below:
Full Details | Bibliographic Reference
Full Details
Title: The Regulation of Entry
Author(s): Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer
Publication Date: September 2001
Keyword(s): business entry and regulation
Programme Area(s): Public Economics and Transition Economics
Abstract: We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data covers the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2953
Bibliographic Reference
Djankov, S, La Porta, R, López-de-Silanes, F and Shleifer, A. 2001. 'The Regulation of Entry'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2953