Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP3163 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

Author(s): Roman Inderst and Christian Wey

Publication Date: January 2002

Keyword(s): merger, oligopoly and takeover bidding

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: This Paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand and costs. We provide a complete analysis for arbitrary numbers of firms, complements and substitutes, and degrees of product differentiation. An increase in concentration is more likely under Cournot competition if products are complements and more likely under Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, as products become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes more likely under Bertrand and less likely under Cournot competition.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3163

Bibliographic Reference

Inderst, R and Wey, C. 2002. 'The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3163