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Title: Unforeseen Contingencies

Author(s): Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli

Publication Date: March 2002

Keyword(s): fine variability, finite invariance, incomplete contracts and unforeseen contingencies

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents ? their consequences and probabilities are known ? but are such that every description of such events necessarily leaves out relevant features that have a non-negligible impact on the parties? expected utilities. Using a simple co-insurance problem as a backdrop, we introduce a model where states are described in terms of objective features, and the description of an event specifies a finite number of such features. In this setting, unforeseen contingencies are present in the co-insurance problem when the first-best risk-sharing contract varies with the states of nature in a complex way that makes it highly sensitive to the component features of the states. In this environment, although agents can compute expected pay-offs, they are unable to include in any ex-ante agreement a description of the relevant contingencies that captures (even approximately) the relevant complexity of the risky environment.

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Bibliographic Reference

Al-Najjar, N, Anderlini, L and Felli, L. 2002. 'Unforeseen Contingencies'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3271