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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk: Implications for Employment Contracts

Author(s): Christopher Pissarides

Publication Date: May 2002

Keyword(s): employment risk, notice of dismissal, severence compensation and unemployment risk

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: This Paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk-averse and there are employment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises during employment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severance compensation to smooth consumption during employment without causing moral hazard. A pre-announced delay in dismissal when the job becomes unproductive provides further insurance but because of moral hazard it does not fully smooth consumption. During the delay consumption falls and the worker searches for another job. No delays in dismissals are optimal if exogenous unemployment compensation is sufficiently generous.

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Bibliographic Reference

Pissarides, C. 2002. 'Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk: Implications for Employment Contracts'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3367