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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device

Author(s): A Lans Bovenberg and Coen N Teulings

Publication Date: July 2002

Keyword(s): commitment, implicit contracts, insurance, moral hazard, principal agent and shirking

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We explore the role of firms in insuring risk-averse workers. As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are sufficiently risk averse and the firm can base incentive payments on good information. Competition, however, may allow the spot market and explicit contracts to crowd out implicit insurance provided by the firm, even though the latter yields higher welfare. We explain why different governance structures coexist in quite homogeneous industries.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bovenberg, A and Teulings, C. 2002. 'Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3441