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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions

Author(s): Anna Mikusheva and Konstantin Sonin

Publication Date: December 2002

Keyword(s): allocative efficiency, auctions and information

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We study the impact of information revelation on efficiency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism. This result cannot be extended to a more general setup: in a second-price sealed-bid auction, revelation of information might lead to efficiency losses.

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Bibliographic Reference

Mikusheva, A and Sonin, K. 2002. 'Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3675