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Title: Durable Goods with Quality Differentiation

Author(s): Roman Inderst

Publication Date: September 2003

Keyword(s): coase conjuncture, durable-Goods monopolist, price discrimination and screening

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: What is the optimal strategy of a durable-goods monopolist that can offer goods in different qualities? This Paper provides an answer for the case where the market is segmented into low- and high-income buyers. If the monopolist can change their product and price policy sufficiently rapidly - which reduces their commitment power - we find that the whole market is served immediately. Low-quality goods may be sold below costs. These results are strikingly different to those obtained with non-durable goods and to those obtained if the durable good comes only in a single quality. In an extension we further employ our results to discuss how policies of restricted versioning fare differently with non-durable and durable goods.

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Bibliographic Reference

Inderst, R. 2003. 'Durable Goods with Quality Differentiation'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4047