Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent

Author(s): Gilles Chemla and Jean-Etienne de Bettignies

Publication Date: December 2003

Keyword(s): competition, corporate venture capitalist, entrepreneur, failure, manager and venture capitalist

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: We consider the motives for a firm to engage in corporate venturing. We argue that in case of failure of a new venture, corporate venture capitalists (CVC) have a strategic advantage relative to traditional venture capitalists (VC) in creating rents after rehiring or refinancing the entrepreneurs. Hence, corporate venturing induces the would-be entrepreneur to exert an effort that is higher than within the corporation, but lower than under traditional venture capital financing. Ceteris paribus, the entrepreneur ends up with fewer shares and less control under CVC financing than under traditional VC financing. Competition from venture capitalists increases corporate venturing activity, the salaries of potential entrepreneurs, and total economic output. Our results are consistent with the observed pro-cyclicality of corporate venture capital activity with venture capital activity.

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Bibliographic Reference

Chemla, G and de Bettignies, J. 2003. 'Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4139