Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP4226 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details

Title: How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?

Author(s): Torsten Persson, G�rard Roland and Guido Tabellini

Publication Date: February 2004

Keyword(s): coalition governments, electoral accountability, electoral rules, fiscal policy and party systems

Programme Area(s): Institutions and Economic Performance, International Macroeconomics, Public Economics and Transition Economics

Abstract: We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4226

Bibliographic Reference

Persson, T, Roland, G and Tabellini, G. 2004. 'How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4226