Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP4331 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details

Title: Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions

Author(s): Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious and Aner Sela

Publication Date: March 2004

Keyword(s): asymmetric auctions, asymptotic methods, collusion, large auctions, revenue equivalence and risk-averse bidders

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4331

Bibliographic Reference

Fibich, G, Gavious, A and Sela, A. 2004. 'Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4331